

## MISPERCEPTIONS, THE MEDIA, AND THE IRAQ WAR

Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay, and Evan Lewis

### Editor’s Note

Sound democratic governance requires a public that is correctly informed about the justifications for major political decisions. That tenet was violated when the United States went to war against Iraq in 2003. Many Americans based their support for the war on false beliefs about key aspects of the situation. Steven Kull, Clay Ramsay, and Evan Lewis carefully analyze what happened and lay bare the many factors that played a part in the development of these serious misperceptions. Their detailed analysis shows that media coverage played a major part, with some news venues producing substantially more misconceptions than their competitors. The authors also make it clear that misperceptions of underlying factors distort public opinions and may produce policies contrary to the public’s wishes.

At the time of this writing, the three authors were affiliated with the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA). Steven Kull served as director, Clay Ramsay as director of research, and Evan Lewis as research associate. Kull, who is affiliated with the University of Maryland’s School of Public Affairs, also directed the Center on Policy Attitudes (COPA), with Ramsay serving as research director. Both are important contributors to the public opinion and foreign policy literature.

The widespread presence of misperceptions [relevant to the rationales for going to war with Iraq] naturally raises the question of whether they are to some extent a function of an individual’s source of news. To find out, in three different polls conducted [by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) and the polling firm Knowledge Networks (KN)] in June, July, and August-September, an aggregate sample of 3,334 respondents was asked, “Where do you tend to get most of your news?” and offered the options of

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“newspapers and magazines” or “TV and radio.” Overall, 19 percent said their primary news source was print media, while 80 percent said it was electronic. Respondents were then asked, “If one of the networks below is your primary source of news please select it. If you get news from two or more networks about equally, just go on to the next question.” The networks offered were ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN, Fox News, PBS, and NPR. Because the PBS and NPR viewers were such a small percentage, we combined them into one category of public networks. In the case of ABC, CBS, and NBC, we do not know how many people primarily got their news from local affiliates and how many from national news shows. Likewise, we do not know if all of those who said that they got their news from Fox News primarily got their news from the national cable news network and how many from local Fox affiliates.<sup>1</sup>

The same respondents were also asked about their perceptions, with 1,362 respondents receiving all three key perception questions and 3,334 respondents receiving at least one of them—that is, whether evidence of close links between Iraq and al Qaeda has been found, whether [Weapons of Mass Destruction] WMD have been found in Iraq, and whether world public opinion approved of the United States going to war with Iraq. . . .

An analysis of those who were asked all of the key three perception questions does reveal a remarkable level of variation in the presence of misperceptions according to news source. Standing out in the analysis are Fox and NPR/PBS, but for opposite reasons. Fox was the news source whose viewers had the most misperceptions. NPR/PBS are notable because their viewers and listeners consistently held fewer misperceptions than respondents who obtained their information from other news sources. Table 9-1 shows this clearly. Listed are the breakouts of the sample according to the frequency of the three key misperceptions (that is, the beliefs that evidence of links between Iraq and al Qaeda has been found, that WMD have been found in Iraq, and that world public opinion approved of the United States going to

**Table 9-1 Frequency of Misperceptions per Respondent: WMD Found, Evidence of al Qaeda Link, and World Majority Support for War (percentages)**

Number of misperceptions per respondent	Fox	CBS	ABC	CNN	NBC	Print media	NPR/PBS
None of the three	20	30	39	45	45	53	77
One or more misperception	80	71	61	55	55	47	23

Source: Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks.

war with Iraq) and their primary news source. In the audience for NPR/PBS, there was an overwhelming majority who did not have any of the three misperceptions, and hardly any had all three.

... The same pattern in the distribution of misperceptions among the news sources was obtained in the cases of each specific misperception. When asked whether the United States has found “clear evidence in Iraq that Saddam Hussein was working closely with the al Qaeda terrorist organization,” among the combined sample for the three-month period, 49 percent said that such evidence had been found (Table 9-2). This misperception was substantially higher among those who get their news primarily from Fox, 67 percent. Once again the NPR/PBS audience was the lowest at 16 percent.

Variations were much more modest on the perception that Iraq was directly involved in September 11. As discussed, the view that Iraq was directly involved in September 11 is not a demonstrable misperception, but it is widely regarded as fallacious by the intelligence community. In this case, the highest level of misperceptions was in the CBS audience (33 percent) followed by Fox (24 percent), ABC (23 percent), NBC (22 percent), and CNN (21 percent). Respondents who got their news primarily from print media (14 percent) and NPR or PBS (10 percent) were less likely to choose this description.

Combining the above group with those who had the less egregious but still unproven belief that Iraq gave substantial support to al Qaeda, the pattern was similar. Among CBS viewers, 68 percent had one of these perceptions, as did 66 percent of Fox viewers, 59 percent of NBC viewers, 55 percent of CNN viewers, and 53 percent of ABC viewers. Print readers were nearly as high at 51 percent, while NPR/PBS audiences were significantly lower at 28 percent.

When respondents were asked whether the United States has “found Iraqi weapons of mass destruction” since the war had ended, 22 percent of all respondents over June through September mistakenly thought this had happened. Once again, Fox viewers were the highest with 33 percent having this

**Table 9-2 Viewers’ Beliefs on Whether the United States Has Found Evidence of an al Qaeda–Iraq Link (percentages)**

Clear evidence of al Qaeda link	NBC	CBS	ABC	Fox	CNN	NPR/PBS	Print media
US has found	49	56	45	67	48	16	40
US has not found	45	41	49	29	47	85	58

Source: Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks.

belief. A lower 19 to 23 percent of viewers who watch ABC, NBC, CBS, and CNN had the perception that the United States has found WMD. Seventeen percent of those who primarily get their news from print sources had the misperception, while only 11 percent who watch PBS or listen to NPR had it (Table 9-3).

Respondents were also asked to give their impression of how they think “people in the world feel about the US having gone to war with Iraq.” Over the three-month period, 25 percent of all respondents said, incorrectly, “the majority of people favor the US having gone to war” (Table 9-4). Of Fox watchers, 35 percent said this. Only 5 percent of those who watch PBS or listen to NPR misperceived world opinion in this way. As usual, those who primarily get their news from print media were the second lowest, with 17 percent having this misperception.

Numerous respondents also chose the option of saying that in world public opinion, views are evenly balanced between favoring and opposing going to war—a misperception, though less egregious. Combining those who said views were evenly balanced with those who assumed that the majority favored the Iraq war—a more inclusive definition of misperception—the same pattern obtained. Fox viewers had the highest level of misperceiving (69 percent) and NPR/PBS the lowest (26 percent). The others also formed a familiar pattern: CBS viewers at 63 percent, ABC at 58 percent, NBC at 56 percent, CNN at 54 percent, and print media at 45 percent.

The same question was asked about European opinion. Perceptions of European views are more accurate among the U.S. public: only 17 percent thought there had been majority support among Europeans for the war. Over the three months, CBS viewers most frequently misperceived European opinion (24 percent); Fox viewers were second (20 percent). The NPR/PBS audience and those relying on printed media were lowest, both at 13 percent.

If one adds together those who thought there was European majority support with those who thought views in Europe were evenly balanced, 47 percent misperceived European opinion; CBS viewers were highest at 56 percent,

**Table 9-3 Perception that the United States Has or Has Not Found Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (percentages)**

Weapons of mass destruction	NBC	CBS	ABC	Fox	CNN	NPR/PBS	Print media
US has found	20	23	19	33	20	11	17
US has not found	79	75	79	64	79	89	82

Source: Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks.

**Table 9-4** World Public Opinion on the United States Going to War (percentages)

Majority of people in world ...	NBC	CBS	ABC	Fox	CNN	NPR/PBS	Print media
Favor US going to war in Iraq	20	28	27	35	24	5	17

Source: Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks.

NBC and Fox viewers were next at 52 percent and 51 percent respectively, while the NPR/PBS audience was lowest at 29 percent. ABC viewers and those using print sources were tied for second lowest at 41 percent.

### The Effect of Variations in Audience Demographics and Attention

The question thus arises of whether the variation in misperceptions is a function of variations in the demographics or political attitudes of the audience. Some audiences varied according to education, party identification, and support for the President. However, . . . when all of these factors are analyzed together, the respondent's primary source of news is still a strong and significant factor; indeed, it was one of the most powerful factors predicting misperceptions.

It would seem reasonable to assume that misperceptions are due to a failure to pay attention to news and that those who have greater exposure to news would have fewer misperceptions. All respondents were asked, "How closely are you following the news about the situation in Iraq now?" For the summer as a whole (June, July, August–September), 13 percent said they were following the news very closely, 43 percent somewhat closely, 29 percent not very closely, and 14 percent not closely at all.

Strikingly, overall, there was no relation between the reported level of attention to news and the frequency of misperceptions. In the case of those who primarily watched Fox, greater attention to news modestly *increased* the likelihood of misperceptions. Only in the case of those who primarily got their news from print did misperceptions decrease with lower levels of attention, though in some cases this occurred for CNN viewers as well.

The most robust effects were found among those who primarily got their news from Fox. Among those who did not follow the news at all, 42 percent had the misperception that evidence of close links to al Qaeda has been found, rising progressively at higher levels of attention to 80 percent among those who followed the news very closely. For the perception that WMD

have been found, those who watched very closely had the highest rate of misperception at 44 percent, while the other levels of attention were lower, though they did not form a clear pattern (not at all, 34 percent; not very, 24 percent; somewhat, 32 percent). Among those who did not follow the news at all, 22 percent believed that world public opinion favored the war, jumping to 34 percent and 32 percent among those who followed the news not very and somewhat closely, respectively, and then jumping even higher to 48 percent among those who followed the news very closely.

With increasing attention, those who got their news from print were less likely to have all three misperceptions. Of those not following the news closely, 49 percent had the misperception that evidence of close links has been found, declining to 32 percent among those who followed the news very closely. Those who did not follow the news at all were far more likely to misperceive (35 percent) that WMD had been found than the other levels (not very, 14 percent; somewhat, 18 percent; very, 13 percent). Twenty-five percent of those who did not follow the news at all had the misperception that world public opinion favored the war, dropping to 16 percent for all other categories.

CNN viewers showed slightly, but significantly, lower levels of misperception on finding WMD and world public opinion at higher levels of attention, though not on evidence of links to al Qaeda. . . .

### Relative Strength of Various Factors Related to Level of Misperception

To determine which factors had the most power to predict the likelihood of misperceiving, we performed a binary logistic regression analysis, together with eight other factors. Four of the factors were demographic: gender, age, household income, and education. Two other categorical factors were party identification and intention to vote for the President in the next election, as opposed to an unnamed Democratic nominee. In addition, we included the factors of how closely people follow events in Iraq and what their primary news source was. The odds ratio statistic was used to determine the likelihood that respondents would have misperceptions.

In the regression analysis, the most powerful factor was the intention to vote for President Bush. As compared to those who intended to vote for the Democratic nominee or were undecided, those who intended to vote for the President were 2.9 times more likely to believe that close links to al Qaeda have been found, 3.0 times more likely to believe that WMD had been found, and 2.6 times more likely to believe that world public opinion was favorable to the war. Overall, those who intended to vote for the President were 3.7 times more likely to have at least one of these misperceptions.

The second most powerful factor was one's primary source of network news. Analysis shows the factor to be highly significant, but assessing each network is difficult. Though several networks are significant, others are not. To determine the relative importance of each network as a primary source of news, another regression was performed, treating each network as a binary variable and comparing each network's respondents to other respondents. When this analysis is performed, having Fox, CBS, or NPR/PBS as one's primary news source emerges as the most significant predictor of a particular misperception and of misperceptions in general. . . . Overall, Fox viewing has the greatest and most consistent predictive power in the analysis on a variety of . . . statistical measures.

Fox is the most consistently significant predictor of misperceptions. Those who primarily watched Fox were 2.0 times more likely to believe that close links to al Qaeda have been found, 1.6 times more likely to believe that WMD had been found, 1.7 times more likely to believe that world public opinion was favorable to the war, and 2.1 times more likely to have at least one misperception. Interestingly, when asked how the majority of people in the world feel about the war, if the response "views are evenly balanced" is included as a misperception along with "favor," only Fox is a significant predictor of that misperception.

Those who primarily watched CBS were 1.8 times more likely to believe that close links to al Qaeda have been found, 1.9 times more likely to believe that world public opinion was favorable to the war, and 2.3 times more likely to have at least one misperception. However, they were not significantly different on beliefs about the uncovering of WMD.

On the other hand, those who primarily watched PBS or listened to NPR were 3.5 times less likely to believe that close links to al Qaeda have been found, 5.6 times less likely to believe that world public opinion was favorable to the war, and 3.8 times less likely to have at least one misperception. However, they were not significantly different on the issue of WMD.

Level of attention to news was not a significant factor overall, with the exception of those who primarily got their news from Fox. This is consistent with the finding that Fox viewers were more likely to misperceive the more closely they followed events in Iraq. . . .

The third most powerful factor was intention to vote for the Democratic nominee. As compared to those who intended to vote for President Bush or were undecided, those who intended to vote for the Democratic nominee were 2.0 times less likely to believe that close links to al Qaeda have been found and 1.8 times less likely to believe that world public opinion was favorable to the war. Overall, those who intended to vote for the Democratic nominee were 1.8 times less likely to have at least one of these misperceptions, but did not quite achieve significance on the WMD question.

The fourth most powerful factor was education. Those who had no college, as compared to those had at least some college, were 1.3 times more likely to believe that close links to al Qaeda have been found and 1.4 times more likely to have at least one misperception, but did not quite achieve significance on the other misperceptions.

Age was a very weak factor, with older people being very slightly less likely to misperceive. All other factors—gender, party identification (when intention to vote for the President was included), level of attention to news, and income—were not significant. In a separate analysis, region of the country was included and also not found to be significant.

### Analysis

These data lead to the question of why so many Americans have misperceptions that appear to be having a significant impact on attitudes about the Iraq war and why these misperceptions vary according to one's source of news and political attitudes. This analysis starts with possible explanations based on exogenous factors and then moves inward.

The first and most obvious reason that the public had so many of these misperceptions is that the Bush administration made numerous statements that could easily be construed as asserting these falsehoods. On numerous occasions the administration made statements strongly implying that it had intelligence substantiating that Iraq was closely involved with al Qaeda and was even directly involved in the September 11 attacks. For example, in his 18 March 2003 Presidential Letter to Congress, President Bush explained that in going to war with Iraq he was taking "the necessary actions against international terrorists and terrorist organizations, including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001."<sup>2</sup> When Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the UN Security Council on 5 February 2003, he presented photographs that were identified as al Qaeda training camps inside Iraq, leaving unclear the fact that the camp in question was in the northern part of Iraq, not under the control of the central Iraqi government.<sup>3</sup> . . . [O]n 14 September 2003, Vice President Richard Cheney made the following ambiguous statement: "If we're successful in Iraq . . . so that it's not a safe haven for terrorists, now we will have struck a major blow right at the heart of the base, if you will, the geographic base of the terrorists who have had us under assault now for many years, but most especially on 9/11."<sup>4</sup> . . .

. . . [I]t is quite clear that the public perceived that the administration was asserting a strong link between Iraq and al Qaeda, even to the point of Iraqi direct involvement in September 11. When PIPA/KN asked in June, "Do you think the Bush administration did or did not imply that Iraq under Saddam

Hussein was involved in the September 11th attacks?" 71 percent said that it had. The administration also made statements that came extremely close to asserting that WMD were found in postwar Iraq. On 30 May 2003, President Bush made the statement, "... for those who say we haven't found the banned manufacturing devices or banned weapons, they're wrong. We found them."<sup>5</sup>

Another possible explanation for why the public had such misperceptions is the way that the media reported the news. The large variation in the level of misperceptions does suggest that some media sources may have been making greater efforts than others to disabuse their audiences of misperceptions they may have had so as to avoid feeling conflict about going or having gone to war. Of course, the presence or absence of misperceptions in viewers does not necessarily prove that they were caused by the presence or absence of reliable reporting by a news source. Variations in the level of misperceptions according to news source may be related to variations in the political orientations of the audience. However, when political attitudes were controlled for the variations between the networks and the same attitudes still obtained. . . .

There is also evidence that in the run-up to, during, and for a period after the war, many in the media appeared to feel that it was not their role to challenge the administration or that it was even appropriate to take an active pro-war posture. Fox News' programming on the war included a flag in the left-hand corner and assumed the Defense Department's name for the war: "Operation Iraqi Freedom." When criticized in a letter for taking a pro-war stance, Fox News' Neil Cavuto replied, "So am I slanted and biased? You damn well bet I am. . . . You say I wear my biases on my sleeve? Better that than pretend you have none, but show them clearly in your work."<sup>6</sup> Interestingly, even CBS News, which tends to have a more liberal reputation, seemed to think along these lines. CBS anchor Dan Rather commented in a 14 April 2003 interview with Larry King, "Look, I'm an American. I never tried to kid anybody that I'm some internationalist or something. And when my country is at war, I want my country to win. . . . Now, I can't and don't argue that that is coverage without a prejudice. About that I am prejudiced."<sup>7</sup>

A study of the frequencies of pro-war and anti-war commentators on the major networks found that pro-war views were overwhelmingly more frequent.<sup>8</sup> In such an environment, it would not be surprising that the media would downplay the lack of evidence of links between Iraq and al Qaeda, the fact that WMD were not being found, and that world public opinion was critical of the war. Furthermore, the fact shown in the present study that the audiences of the various networks have varied so widely in the prevalence of misperceptions lends credence to the idea that media outlets had the capacity to play a more critical role, but to varying degrees chose not to.

Reluctant to challenge the administration, the media can simply become a means of transmission for the administration, rather than a critical filter. For example, when President Bush made the assertion that WMD had been found, the 31 May 2003 edition of the *Washington Post* ran a front page headline saying, "Bush: 'We Found' Banned Weapons."<sup>9</sup> There is also striking evidence that the readiness to challenge the administration is a variable that corresponds to levels of misperception among viewers. . . . [T]he two networks notably least likely to present critical commentary were Fox and CBS—the same two networks that in the present study had viewers most likely to have misperceptions. . . .

Another contributing factor may also have been a dynamic in reporting that is not unique to the Iraq war: the absence of something does not constitute a compelling story, while even the prospect of the presence of something does. Thus, shortly after the end of the war, numerous headlines trumpeted even faint prospects that evidence of WMD were about to be found. However, when these prospects failed to materialize, this did not constitute a compelling story and, thus, reporting on it was given a far less prominent position. The cumulative effect of repeatedly hearing the expectation that weapons were about to be found, while hearing little or no disconfirmation, could well contribute to the impression that at least one of these leads was indeed fruitful.

Other more subtle dynamics may also have been at work. The fact that world public opinion was so opposed to the United States going to war with Iraq may have been obscured by giving such high visibility to the U.S. conflict with France in the Security Council. The key story became one of French obstructionism, eclipsing the fact that polls from around the world, as well as the distribution of positions in the UN Security Council, showed widespread opposition to U.S. policy.

One could well argue that this plethora of exogenous factors obviates the need for any explanations based on endogenous factors. Indeed, the fact that no particular misperception studied was found in a clear majority of the public and the fact that 40 percent had none of the key misperceptions buttress confidence in the capacity of the public to sort through misleading stimuli. At the same time, a majority had at least one major misperception, raising the question of why so many people have been susceptible.

The seemingly obvious explanation—that the problem is that people just do not pay enough attention to the news—does not hold up. As discussed, higher levels of attention to news did not reduce the likelihood of misperception, and in the case of those who primarily got their news from Fox News, misperceptions increased with greater attention. Furthermore, the presence of misperceptions was not just noise found randomly throughout an

inattentive public—the presence of misperceptions formed strong patterns highly related to respondents' primary source of news.

Perhaps the most promising explanation is that the misperceptions have performed an essential psychological function in mitigating doubts about the validity of the war. Polls have shown that Americans are quite resistant to the idea of using military force except in self-defense or as part of a multilateral operation with UN approval. . . . Thus, to legitimate the war without UN approval, the President had to make the case that the war would be an act of self-defense. . . .

Americans had expected that once the United States went into Iraq, they would find evidence that Iraq was linked to al Qaeda and was developing WMD, thus vindicating the decision to go to war as an act of self-defense. Therefore, it is not surprising that many have been receptive when the administration has strongly implied or even asserted that the United States has found evidence that Iraq was working closely with al Qaeda and was developing WMD, and when media outlets—some more than others—have allowed themselves to be passive transmitters of such messages.

## Conclusion

From the perspective of democratic process, the findings of this study are cause for concern. They suggest that if the public is opposed to taking military action without UN approval and the President is determined to do so, he has remarkable capacities to move the public to support his decision. This in itself is not worrisome—to the degree it is the product of persuasion, based on the merits of an argument. What is worrisome is that it appears that the President has the capacity to lead members of the public to assume false beliefs in support of his position. In the case of the Iraq war, this dynamic appears to have played a critical role: among those who did not hold the key false beliefs, only a small minority supported the decision to go to war. In a regression analysis, the presence of misperceptions was the most powerful factor predicting support for the war, with intention to vote for the President close behind. This does not prove that the misperceptions alone caused support for the war. It is more likely that it is one key factor that interacted with the desire to rally around the President and the troops. However, it does appear that it would have been significantly more difficult for the President to elicit and maintain support for the decision to go to war if the public had not held such misperceptions.

The President's influence is not limitless. He does not appear to be capable of getting the public to go against their more deeply held value orientations. If he did, then it would not be necessary for the public to develop false beliefs. But he is capable of prompting the public to support him by developing

the false beliefs necessary to justify the administration's policies in a way that is consistent with the public's deeper value orientations.

It also appears that the media cannot necessarily be counted on to play the critical role of doggedly challenging the administration. The fact that viewers of some media outlets had far lower levels of misperceptions than did others (even when controlling for political attitudes) suggests that not all were making the maximal effort to counter the potential for misperception.

To some extent, this period may be regarded as unique. We are still living in the aftermath of September 11. With the persisting sense of threat, the public may be more prone to try to accommodate the President, and the media may be more reluctant to challenge the President or to impart news that calls into question the validity of his decisions. And yet, it is also at times of threat that the most critical decisions are likely to be made.

It is likely that with time, public misperceptions will tend to erode. For example, after media coverage of David Kay's interim progress report on the activities of the Iraq Survey Group, the belief that WMD have been found dropped to 15 percent, although the belief that evidence of links to al Qaeda has been found did not drop. At the same time, there was a significant rise in the percentage that said they thought that the President at least stretched the truth when he made the case for war based on Iraq having a WMD program.<sup>10</sup> However, when the mechanisms for informing the public are in some way compromised, the process of the public gradually catching on is a slow one. In the meantime, the administration, by giving incorrect information, can gain support for policies that might not be consistent with the preferences held by the majority of Americans.

## Notes

1. Numbers for those naming a network as their primary news source were as follows: Fox, 520; CBS, 258; CNN, 466; ABC, 315; NBC, 420; NPR/PBS, 91. All findings in this section were statistically significant at the  $p < 0.05$  level, except where noted.
2. President George W. Bush, "Presidential Letter," 18 March 2003, available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-1.html>.
3. Secretary Colin L. Powell, "Remarks to the United Nations," New York City, 5 February 2003, available at <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/17300.htm>, 12 October 2003.
4. Vice President Richard Cheney, "Meet the Press," 14 September 2003.
5. Mike Allen, "Bush: 'We Found' Banned Weapons; President Cites Trailers in Iraq as Proof," *Washington Post*, 31 May 2003.
6. David Folkenflik, "Fox News defends its patriotic coverage: Channel's objectivity is questioned," *Baltimore Sun*, 2 April 2003.
7. Dan Rather, during the 14 April 2003 *Larry King Live*. Quoted in Steve Rendell and Tara Broughel, "Amplifying Officials, Squelching Dissent: FAIR study finds

democracy poorly served by war coverage," *Extra!* (May/June 2003), Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, available at [www.fair.org/extra/0305/warstudy.html](http://www.fair.org/extra/0305/warstudy.html).


8. Rendell and Broughel, "Amplifying Officials, Squelching Dissent."
9. Allen, "Bush: 'We Found' Banned Weapons," 31 May 2003.
10. See Steven Kull, "Americans Reevaluate Going to War with Iraq," PIPA/Knowledge Networks Poll, 13 November 2003, available at [www.pipa.org](http://www.pipa.org).

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